ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The risk management process is a very important task in the field of asset management, due to the huge amounts of components and the condition of the equipment which has a crucial impact on the system performance, especially at system nodes. The utilities are being asked to enhance the reliability and in the same time to safe costs of maintenance or to reduce the operational costs. In order to find a trade-off between these both tasks an asset manager needs tools and methods that can objectively quantify the benefits from maintenance and optimize the allocation of resources. The optimal allocation can be performed by the analysis of the impact of component failures on the system behavior. Generally the impact can be evaluated by the calculation of reliability indices at system nodes considering the assumed reliability of the components. The results are the average interruption duration or frequency (CAIDI, CAIFI, SAIDI or SAIFI) or the not delivered energy. A further step is to analyze the influence of the reliability on total outage costs including costs for not delivered energy or repair costs and penalties. The aim of the risk management is to measure the outage consequences and to compare these with the maintenance expenditures. Conventional methods of risk assessment derive the risk indicators by consideration of mean values and variances of certain parameters (e.g. failure rate, duration, not delivered energy, repair costs, penalties etc.). This kind of calculation is known as point estimation. The great disadvantage of these methods is that the estimated values do not include information about uncertainties which are included in the indices. Furthermore it is desirable to have a confidence interval to cover the uncertainties of statistics. Such an interval contains information about confidence of risk numbers and can vary depending on usefulness and calculation efforts. This paper uses the experience of risk management of financial world for the calculation of more appropriated risk indices. expected maximum loss (or worst loss) over a target horizon within a given confidence level [2] . In consequence the intention is to assess the highest loss in a time period with an appropriated confidence level. For example VaR 95 (1 year) = 1 Mio € means the loss per year does not exceed the amount of 1 Mio. € within the confidence interval of 95%. The VaR can be derived from the x-axis of Figure 1 depending on the density function f(x) and the defined confidence level.
VALUE AT RISK CALCULATION WITH LOSS DISTRIBUTION APPROACH
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Figure 1: Principle of VaR derivation RISK ASSESSMENT OF POWER SYSTEMS

General Concept
The risk assessment in electrical power systems presuppose the specification of risk types arising in the considered level. For this reason the separation of risk events by their impacts and the reasons that caused these events has to be performed, depending on different types of equipment. In this case the following assets have to be taken into consideration:
XPLE cables and paper insulated cables, circuit-breakers and disconnectors, power transformers and bus bars, substations, including the secondary equipment.
For each type of component the reliability data are used according to the statistics of the German power system. The failure reasons are categorized in three different classes: natural disturbances, which include weather catastrophes, failure caused by external interferences, which are influences of persons of a third party. The last category includes failures which can be traced back to system operation and equipment conditions. Such grouping is useful because the risk minimization activities must be adjusted in different ways for each failure reason category. For example the minimization of failure risks caused by natural disturbances in case of increasing the maintenance activities should not be useful. In contrast the risks of the third category can be influenced by appropriated maintenance activities.
According to the LDA concept described above the costs of the risk matrix class ij is given by the following equation:
Co(i,j) costs of outages of the asset group i caused by events category j P(i) interrupted power caused by asset i Pr price of not delivered energy D(i,j) interruption duration of the asset group i caused by event category j C(i) repair costs of asset group i (material costs, personal costs) N(f) amount of events depending on the failure frequency All factors of Eq. 2 are stochastic and are described by parametric distribution functions. The principal workflow for the calculation of risk indices is presented in Figure 2 for one matrix class. The workflow of the VaR calculation can be expressed in different steps. The historical data of failure events are analyzed, the results are failure statistics of components and failure events which are grouped in accordance with the risk matrix. The aim of the next step is to derive the distribution function of the reliability data of each group, as they are important for the calculation of the combined risk index. The procedure is that firstly the empirical distribution function is depicted from the given reliability data and next the fitting of the parametrical distribution function is performed. The result of this step is the parametric distribution function of reliability data of assets like failure frequency and failure duration.
On the other site the economical analysis of the consequences in case of a failure event must be performed. For this reason the historical repair data like material costs, personal expenses and costs of external service providers are collected and analyzed. Furthermore the derivation of the distribution functions has to be calculated. The next step is the evaluation of the influence of the topology on the operational risk. In this part the simulation of the failure events and failure effect analysis of the considered network is performed 
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Example: 10 kV distribution grid
The VaR method according to the above mentioned procedure is applied to a 10 kV cable network. This particular underground urban cable network is operated in the southern part of Germany. In general the network is fed by a 110/10 kV power transformer, whereas the second transformer is in stand by operation. Furthermore the cable network is operated as open loop systems (9 loops). The detailed data of the system are listed in Table 2 . Table 1 : Technical data of the distribution network Figure 3 shows the general topology of the used system. In addition the consequences of asset failures have to be calculated. Figure 6 shows exemplary the distribution function of the repair costs of cables, which are assumed to be independent from the type of cables. The dashed line shows the empirical distribution function of original data. Furthermore the differences of the failure classes are not calculated due to of the missing information regarding the failure reasons. In this case the mean value of the costs amount to 5,22 k€ and 5 % of the repairs exceed a value of 18,91 k€.
Figure 6: Distribution function of repair costs (cables)
A very important part of the risk assessment is the evaluation of the availability at certain system nodes to which customers are connected. Therefore the active 
CONCLUSION
The main benefit of the described VaR method is the possibility to have an exact view into the risk structures of each risk factors. VaR application allows the sensibility analysis of risk factors like changes in topology or changes in failure frequency and duration of assets. Furthermore it should be possible to minimize the risk value of the complete system by considering the influence of different asset groups.
